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Attitudes toward Immigration and Refugee Policy: A Global Study[1]

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Abstract

In recent years, several high-profile refugee crises highlighted the varied approaches and attitudes toward refugees both within and across countries. The ongoing Syrian refugee crisis due to the Syrian civil war, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 each led millions of those countries' residents to seek asylum worldwide. Individuals' attitudes toward "outsiders" vary across countries, people groups, and often by individual characteristics. Individuals hold a range of knowledge and views about immigrants and refugees and the different reasons they migrate. In this study, we combine Gallup World Poll Data with United Nations refugee data to explore the relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and the number of refugees in a country relative to the population. We focus on a subset of countries available in the Gallup data which host or are geographically close to the majority of the world's refugees. We posit that the number of refugees in a country, relative to the population, correlates with attitudes toward immigrants in the individual's area. Using ordinary least squares regression and the Gallup-provided survey weights, we find that there is a negative correlation between the relative number of refugees in a country and individuals' reports that their area is a good place for immigrants. The negative correlation remains even with an extensive set of control variables. This suggests that a higher number of refugees within a country correlates with diminished views that the respondent's area is a good place for immigrants. While the sign of the coefficient is consistently negative, the size of the coefficient is tiny. Thus, while policymakers and leaders ought to be aware of this negative correlation, it does not appear to be a primary correlate with attitudes toward immigrants.

Key Words:

Immigration, refugees, policy, attitudes, Gullup

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1. Introduction

At the time of writing, two large refugee crises have been displayed prominently on the global stage over the past two years. Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, millions of Afghan residents sought asylum worldwide. After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, millions of Ukraine residents fled to safety. At the same time, there have been ongoing crises in Syria, Myanmar, Venezuela, and Ethiopia. Understanding the potential relationship between refugee presence and attitudes toward immigration becomes ever more important.

Attitudes towards "outsiders" vary across countries, people groups, and often by individual characteristics. Individuals hold a range of knowledge and views about immigrants, asylees, and refugees, and the different reasons they may migrate. In this study, we combine Gallup World Poll Data with United Nations refugee data to explore the relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and the number of refugees in a country relative to the population. We focus on a subset of countries available in the Gallup data which host or are geographically close to the majority of the world's refugees. We posit that the number of refugees in a country, relative to the population, correlates with attitudes toward immigrants in the individual's area. Using ordinary least squares regression and the Gallup-provided survey weights, we find that there is a consistently negative correlation between the number of refugees in a country (relative to the population) and individuals' reports that their area is a good place for immigrants. The coefficient is consistently negative even with the addition of an extensive set of control variables. That said, the correlation is miniscule, inviting reservation about the importance of the relationship between the size of the refugee population in a country and individuals' attitudes toward immigrants.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Definition and Trends

In general, immigration includes the voluntary relocation of a person to a new nation state or political unit over recognized boundaries, typically with the goal of becoming a permanent resident (Anheier et al., 2012). However, this general definition belies what is often a complex and sometimes coercive combination of motivational factors, sometimes called "push and pull factors," that influence immigration decisions (Chang-Muy, 2018). Push factors are the forces that compel someone to leave their home – ranging from fear for their life, to famine, to lack of educational or employment opportunities in their home. These can often fall into the categories of fear of violence/lack of safety or more economic-oriented push factors (Chishti et al., 2015). Pull factors are the forces that draw someone into a new country – for example, safety, freedom, and the availability of more job or educational opportunities (Chang-Muy, 2018). Pull factors could also be the desire to reunite with family in the destination country or in particular more welcoming laws and policies for migrants (Chishti et al., 2015). Some countries are seen as transit countries due to the perception of them not being receptive to refugees or asylees; perhaps they have lower admittance rates or fewer opportunities for migrants to integrate. This is different from countries that have a reputation for being "destination countries", which have more appealing "pull factors" perhaps because of the type of protections that they offer or the types of benefits that are available (Valenta, Zuparic-Iljic et al., 2015).

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Residents of nations receiving immigrants often focus on the pull factors obvious to the established citizens, such as migration to seek a better life (economic migrants). Push factors, however, are becoming more important as crises due to war, persecution, or other dangers impact greater numbers of people. Usually, migrants will leave their home country and strive for a new destination country due to a complex combination of push and pull factors that often is outside of their control (Chishti et al., 2015). The second type of immigrant falls into the special category of refugees, defined under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28/7/1951, entered into force 22/4/1954, 189 UNTS 137, 1951 Convention) and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31/1/1967, entered into force 4/10/1967, 606 UNTS 267, 1967 Protocol).

Refugees are internationally recognized as deserving of special protections and worthy of being granted asylum. In fact, the international community takes refugee status so seriously that, included in the 1951 Convention are important principles of non-discrimination, non-penalization, and non-refoulement. If a person meets the definition of a refugee, countries who are party to the 1951 Convention are not supposed to refuse them based on additional factors such as their sexuality, religion, or country of origin (non-discrimination). Non-penalization means that countries are not allowed to punish refugees for violating immigration laws such as illegal entry or stay. For example, countries are not supposed to arbitrarily detain someone who illegally entered to seek asylum. Finally, the principle of non-refoulement means that countries cannot deport or expulse refugees. Specifically, the 1951 Convention states:

> "The principle of non-refoulement is so fundamental that no reservations or derogations may be made to it. It provides that no one shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom." (Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, 2010, Introductory Note, para. 3)

According to World Population Review, the United States has the largest foreign-born population at 48.2 million, followed by Russia at 11.6 million (2021). However, the United Arab Emirates has the highest proportion of immigrants globally, with 87.3% of its total population being foreign-born (World Population Review, 2021). This is distinct from having the largest refugee population, which is a population that would have arrived after experiencing danger or persecution. Thirty-nine percent of the world's refugees are hosted in just five countries: Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda, and Germany (UNHCR, 2021a). Lebanon and Jordan host the most refugees per capita (Statista, 2019). As of fall 2021, 68% of the world's refugees come from the following five countries: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Myanmar (UNHCR, 2021a).

Just as there are reasons that compel immigrants or refugees to migrate (i.e., "push" factors that are most visible to migrants), there are also reasons that may motivate individuals to welcome (or not welcome) the migrants (i.e., "pull" factors most visible to residents of destination countries). We next explore the psychological and societal correlates of these attitudes toward immigrants.

2.2. Psychological Correlates of Attitudes toward Immigrants

Psychologically, variables related to immigration attitudes include political persuasion, with right-leaning individuals in the U.S. endorsing greater opposition to immigration. These individuals are more likely to endorse beliefs that society should conform to one

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standard, and to be tolerant of inequality. Education tends to amplify these beliefs, because more highly-educated individuals tend to develop a more coherent ideology that intensifies their political beliefs (Heijden et al., 2020).

Additionally, attitudes can be reinforced with the type of news that an individual consumes. For example, the way the news is visually framed (such as on social media or with a photograph) can impact the responses of the consumer. Negative emotional responses have been found to have been generated by messages that were framed politically, resulting in elevated perceptions of threat and support for more closed policy. However, when the article or news information elicited positive emotional responses, it was due to the information being framed from a human-interest frame, predicting attitudes that were less concerned about threats and more concerned about aiding and welcoming immigrants and migrants (Parrott et al., 2019).

Religiosity is not predictive of attitudes toward immigration, but people who report religious affiliation tend to have more negative views of immigration, particularly refugees (Deslandes et al., 2019). One meta-analysis of 37 studies found that Muslims tend to oppose immigration more than Christians (Deslandes & Anderson, 2019). A general willingness to help is associated with more openness toward refugees, but this connection between psychological trait and attitude toward immigration can be changed by exposure to various external influences (Czymara, 2021).

2.3. Societal Correlates of Immigration Attitudes

As one might expect, changes in immigration patterns and attitudes toward immigration are linked, but the relationship is complex. A longitudinal analysis of the 2015 spike in EU immigration revealed that negative attitudes toward immigration may increase during a surge, and these negative attitudes persist if immigration results in demographic shifts in a country's population.

We suggest that this persistent negative attitude may relate to a population's proportion of immigrants, due to a zero-sum or competitive view toward limited resources. Thus, as the proportion of the population affected by immigration increases, it diminishes the appeal of the country as a good place for immigrants. This model of immigration attitudes is reflective of recent work that found perceptions of the competitiveness of immigrants mediated attitudes toward immigrants, in line with classical group conflict theories (Verbena et al., 2021). Specifically, we hypothesize that more recent immigration patterns would be linked to attitudes toward immigrants revealed in the comprehensive Gallup World Data.

3. Sample Selection Criteria

In order to examine the relationship between refugees in a country and attitudes toward immigration, we focus our sample on countries with extensive exposure to refugees. Some of these countries historically welcomed refugees; these are countries that have actively resettled refugees. Refugee crises were often happening far enough away geographically from these countries that they had to actively invite refugees to resettle there. In this category we include Canada, Germany (due to their welcoming position under Angela Merkel), Uganda, and the United States. Since the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, the U.S. has been one of the most welcoming countries in the world, however this more welcoming stance diminished during recent presidencies.

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Another set of countries we include has absorbed many refugees. Much of that has been due to their proximity to countries who were sending refugees, not because of a particularly open stance in terms of policy. This group includes Chad, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey. Chad, for example, did not have an asylum law until December of 2020. This new law ensures fundamental protections for refugees. For decades, refugees from Sudan, Central African Republic, Nigeria, and Cameroon fled to Chad. Chad also has a high number of internally displaced citizens (UNHCR, 2021b). Our sample ends in 2019, so Chad's law does not affect our study.

Jordan and Lebanon both received thousands of refugees from Syria since the conflict in Syria began in 2011. In fact, it is estimated that more than a million Syrian refugees have fled to each of these countries (Yaha et al., 2018). However, neither Jordan nor Lebanon ratified either the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, and thus do not recognize the rights the 1951 Convention establishes. Indeed, these countries view those fleeing as guests. They welcome international agencies to help care for refugees but as nations, they do not actively care for or recognize these people as refugees.

In addition, Pakistan is not a party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, though the country hosts many refugees due to the ongoing conflict in its neighboring country of Afghanistan. UNHCR works on behalf of the Pakistan government to determine refugee status of people fleeing to Pakistan, and the Government of Pakistan usually honors the UNHCR decision (UNHCR Pakistan, n.d.).

Finally, Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees globally; the country has at least 3.6 million Syrians registered as refugees alone. While Turkey is a party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, as a country it is committed to being an asylum country, but not a resettlement country. This means that Turkey will accept refugees and asylum seekers temporarily but would prefer that they permanently resettle in a third country (UNHCR Turkey, n.d.).

Our last group of countries include those which have not historically been welcoming to immigrants. These are countries who maintain or recently implemented closed polices towards refugees. Hungary, for example, passed a law in 2016 that allowed police to forcibly remove people who may have crossed the border whether or not they are seeking protection. Since that time, the authorities have removed more than 71,000 people (UNHCR, March 2021) in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. More recently, Lithuania's parliament approved mass detention of migrants, not allowing them to appeal (Sytas, 2021), in violation of the principle of non-penalization. However, these former Sovietbloc countries have shown that they are more willing to accept refugees that are close in proximity or hold similar cultures or backgrounds. Their response to Russia's February 2022 attack on Ukraine revealed a willingness to accept certain types of refugees fleeing Ukraine.

Finally, the Gulf States of Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE), while close in proximity to the top refugee-making countries of Syria and Afghanistan, have not opened their doors to these refugees (UNHCR, 2021a). In fact, neither Kuwait nor the UAE have ratified the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. While each of these countries welcome a number of immigrants to benefit their economies, they do not have an asylee or refugee system, and the immigrants that they welcome are only allowed to stay on a temporary basis (Charles, 2020; UNHCR, 2013; UNHCR, 2019).

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In section 5 below, we provide detailed information on the source of our data.

4. Model

Our sample of countries includes widely varying refugee populations and policies toward refugees, as well as widely varying sociodemographic characteristics. As such, we devise a model to estimate the correlation between individuals' attitudes toward immigrants and the number of refugees in the country. Controlling for the differences in characteristics, we estimate the relationship between the number of refugees relative to the population of a country and attitudes toward immigration. We include the characteristics that may influence attitudes toward immigrants, including measures for religion, economic opportunity, and life stage of respondents.

We estimate the following model:

$$GoodPlace_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RefugeesPer100k_{jt-1} + \beta_2 Religion_{ijt} + \beta_3 Female_{ijt} + \beta_4 Education_{ijt} + \beta_5 MaritalStatus_{ijt} + \beta_6 Age_{ijt} + \beta_7 Age2_{ijt} + \beta_8 AgeMissing_{ijt} + \beta_9 \gamma_j + \beta_{10} \delta_t$$

where

$GoodPlace_{ijt}$	= 1 if respondent i in country j in year t answers "my area is a good place for immigrants"
$RefugeesPer100k_{jt-1}$	= the number of refugees recorded by the UN in country j in year t-1 per 100,000 residents
$Religion_{ijt}$	is a categorical variable indicating the religion of respondent i in country j in year t
$Female_{ijt}$	= 1 if respondent i in country j in year t is female
$Education_{ijt}$	is a categorical variable indicating the educational attainment of respondent i in country j in year t
$MaritalStatus_{ijt}$	is a categorical variable indicating the marital status of respondent i in country j in year t
Age_{ijt}	is a continuous variable of the age of respondent i in country j in year t
$AgeMissing_{ijt}$	= 1 if respondent i in country j in year t is missing age
γ_j	are country fixed effects
δt	are year fixed effects

In the above model, we hypothesize that β_1 will not be equal to zero, that is, that the number of refugees in a country in a given year (and its changes over time) will correlate with the attitudes of residents toward immigration in the following year. We do not have expectations on the sign. It could be that more refugees indicate to residents that their country is a good place for immigration, indicating that β_1 is positive. It could be that more refugees lead to hostility toward the immigrant population (the zero-sum view), leading respondents to reactively state that their area is not a good place for immigrants (β_1 is negative).

We also hypothesize that the respondent characteristics included in the model will help predict an individual respondent's answer to whether their area is a good place for

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immigrants. We do not have strong expectations on signs of most of the coefficients β_2 to β_8, only that they differ from zero.

However, for β_4 we have a directional expectation. Given the increased opportunity and knowledge about the world that comes with higher levels of education, we expect that β_4 is positive. The more highly educated the individual, the more likely the individual is to report their area is a good place for immigrants.

5. Data

In order to examine the correlation between residents' attitudes toward immigration, demographic characteristics, and a country's flow of refugees, we combine data from two sources. Our first dataset is a subset of the Gallup World Poll. The Gallup World Poll surveys individuals in nearly every country every year. Typically, Gallup achieves 1,000 respondents in each country each year, though the number can vary with the number of survey instances and response rates, as well as geopolitical complications. Each country's respondents are surveyed in their main languages. Gallup uses phone interviews, which last between 20 and 30 minutes, when at least 80% of households in a country have phone coverage. When phone coverage is less widespread, Gallup uses face-to-face interviews which last 30-60 minutes (Gallup "Getting Started", 2020).

While the Gallup World Poll includes nearly every country in the world over many years, we use a subset in this paper. We limit the dataset to countries with a high refugee flow or high potential refugee flow due to the nature of our research question. We provided an extended explanation for the countries included in section 3 above. Our sample includes Canada, Chad, Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lithuania, Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Due to data availability for the countries in our selected sample, we use the survey years of 2013 to 2019. All demographic and attitude variables are derived from the Gallup surveys. All calculations included below use the appropriate weighting to generate adult resident population estimates within each country-year (Gallup "Getting Started" 2020).

In addition to the Gallup World Poll data, we use the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Data Finder and UNRWA database to determine the number of refugees in each country for the sample years, as well as the population totals for those countries (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/).

The primary variable of interest is from Gallup's World Poll. It asks, "Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for immigrants from other countries?" The possible answers include: a good place; not a good place; I don't know; (refusal to answer). We consider two specifications of this outcome variable. The first, which we refer to as *GoodPlace* (broad), sets individuals who report "a good place" equal to 1, and all other answers are set to 0. The second, which we refer to as *GoodPlace* (narrow), also sets individuals who report "a good place" equal to 1, but only "not a good place" is set to 0, and those answering "don't know" or who refused to answer are excluded from the analysis. Our reasoning for this separation is that on the one hand, those who do not answer in the affirmative seem to be consistent with a non-positive view toward immigration. On the other hand, the "don't know" and refusal to answer options could indicate a lack of awareness or opinion on the matter, and coding them as negative toward immigration is inappropriate. We present results for both variables in our summary statistics in Tables 1, 2, and 3. The results for other variables with missing values differ

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substantially depending on the inclusion of the "don't know/refuse" group, though other variables' coefficients (those which are not coded as "don't know/refuse") have minimal differences. This influence of the "don't know/refuse" control variable is not surprising as individuals who are not answering one of the survey questions are more likely to fail to answer other questions in the survey. As such, the results for the broad measure are available upon request.

We provide summary statistics for our data in Tables 1 through 3 and Figures 1 through 4. In Table 1, we show the total number of respondents within each country in our sample for both the broad (Panel A) and narrow (Panel B) definitions of our variable of interest, *GoodPlace*. We observe that not all participants in the World Poll in a given year receive the immigration question of interest, leading to some variation in sample size. Our full sample includes 94,289 respondents for the broad definition (Panel A), and 87,986 for the narrow definition (Panel B).

Table 1: Gallup Sample Sizes by Country and Year

Panel A: *GoodPlace* (broad)					**Year**			
Country	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**Total**
Canada	586	1,021	672	525	1,005	1,009	1,031	5,849
Chad	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,111	7,111
Germany	751	1,002	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,025	6,778
Hungary	1,019	1,003	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,080	7,102
Jordan	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,012	1,002	1,001	7,015
Kuwait	1,008	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,023	7,031
Lebanon	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,040	7,040
Lithuania	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,080	7,080
Pakistan	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,600	1,000	1,091	7,691
Turkey	1,000	1,001	1,002	1,001	1,000	1,000	2,059	8,063
Uganda	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	7,000
United Arab Emirates	1,000	1,005	1,898	1,855	1,850	1,857	1,413	10,878
United States	506	1,027	609	540	939	1,004	1,026	5,651
Total	11,870	13,059	13,181	12,921	14,406	13,872	14,980	94,289
Panel B: *GoodPlace* (narrow)					**Year**			
	2013	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**Total**
Canada	575	1,008	656	512	987	987	1,010	5,735
Chad	965	986	983	966	903	908	1,055	6,766
Germany	708	951	967	948	953	928	955	6,410
Hungary	784	833	801	865	892	802	911	5,888
Jordan	967	953	987	984	990	983	987	6,851
Kuwait	992	959	972	993	973	966	989	6,844
Lebanon	964	928	935	932	974	982	970	6,685
Lithuania	738	708	779	748	794	708	725	5,200
Pakistan	958	916	1,000	1,000	1,457	904	1,043	7,278
Turkey	886	950	934	932	929	941	1,952	7,524
Uganda	970	944	935	983	966	935	948	6,681
United Arab Emirates	977	984	1,859	1,830	1,817	1,802	1,389	10,658
United States	492	990	591	506	908	964	1,015	5,466
Total	10,976	12,110	12,399	12,199	13,543	12,810	13,949	87,986

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Source: Authors' calculations of Gallup World Poll data 2013-2019

Table 2 shows the average refugee populations in each country for the sample period. Note that given the slightly smaller sample in the narrow definition of *GoodPlace*, the numbers differ slightly. There is wide variation in the refugee population in the countries in our sample. The group of countries with the highest number of refugees is the same as the group with the highest number of refugees per 100,000 in the host country. This surprised us, as the populations of the high-refugee countries also widely vary. The high-refugee countries are Chad, Germany, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, and Uganda. We also indicate on the table which countries are signatories of the 1951 Convention. This includes Canada, Chad, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Turkey, Uganda, and the United States.

Table 2

	GoodPlace (broad)				GoodPlace (narrow)			
	Avg # of Refugees over Sample Years		Avg # of Refugees per 100K		Avg # of Refugees over Sample Years		Avg # of Refugees per 100K	
	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
Canada ^	125,682	405	351	1.2	125,643	409	350	1.3
Chad *^	412,684	498	2926	3.8	413,068	516	2933	4.0
Germany *^	630,450	4743	767	5.7	627,153	4885	763	5.9
Hungary ^	4,321	17	44	0.2	4,334	19	44	0.2
Jordan *	2,763,997	2632	30193	12.7	2,765,433	2656	30187	12.8
Kuwait	701	2	18	0.0	701	2	18	0.0
Lebanon *	1,341,195	4545	20830	63.1	1,339,023	4704	20787	65.2
Lithuania ^	1,218	4	42	0.2	1,206	5	42	0.2
Pakistan *	1,483,633	1536	745	1.2	1,485,686	1564	746	1.2
Turkey *^	2,464,414	16229	3061	19.6	2,490,237	16611	3092	20.0
Uganda *^	676,868	6244	1695	14.4	675,199	6362	1691	14.7
United Arab Emirates	760	3	8	0.0	761	3	8	0.0
United States ^	281,147	314	87	0.1	281,295	320	87	0.1

*Countries with * rank in top half of most refugees, and most refugees per 100k (perfect overlap)*
Countries with ^ are signatories of the 1951 Convention

In Figures 1, 2 and 3 we display the number of refugees in each country in each year. We separate the countries into low-refugee, medium-refugee, and high-refugee groups according to the estimates from refugees per 100,000. There are natural breaks in the data which allows for this separation. Figure 1 provides the chart of low-refugee countries, Hungary, Kuwait, Lithuania, United Arab Emirates, and the United States. Figure 2 shows the medium-refugee countries, Canada, Chad, Germany, Pakistan, Turkey, and Uganda. Evident on the graph is the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis, which led to a dramatic rise in refugees in Turkey, as well as the South Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo refugee crises which contributed to the majority of Uganda's rising refugee levels. Figure 3 displays the trends for Jordan and Lebanon. Note the tremendous difference in refugee population per 100,000 in this chart compared to the previous two.

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Figure 1



Source: Authors' calculations of UNHCR data 2012-2018

Figure 2



Source: Authors' calculations of UNHCR data 2012-2018

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Figure 3



Source: Authors' calculations of UNHCR data 2012-2018

Table 3 provides the demographic characteristics of the countries for both the broad and narrow samples of *GoodPlace* in the full sample and those in the group with the most refugees. There are notable differences between the full sample and the subset of countries with the most refugees. By definition, the number of refugees is higher for the subset, nearly double the number and number per 100,000 as the full sample. Related to our research question, we see that the countries that take in the most refugees have a lower proportion of survey respondents who report their area is a good place for immigrants. Turning to religion, we see that respondents in high-refugee countries are predominantly Muslim, and slightly less Christian. There are also distinct differences by education. The high-refugee-country respondents have lower educational attainment, as they are substantially more likely to have completed elementary education or less, and less likely to have secondary or tertiary education. There are no notable differences by marital status, and the high-refugee-country respondents are slightly younger.

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Table 3: Sample Characteristics

	GoodPlace (broad)		GoodPlace (narrow)	
	Full Sample	Most Refugees	Full Sample	Most Refugees
	Mean SE	Mean SE	Mean SE	Mean SE
Asylum refugees per 100k population	4711	8627	4868	8759
	35.9	58.7	37.8	60.7
Asylum refugees total	797,201	1,426,809	816,264	1,434,169
	3978	5350	4157	5505
Proportion of respondents who report their country is a "good place" for immigrants	0.6012 0.0020	0.5503 0.0027	0.6459 0.0020	0.5808 0.0027
Religion				
Christian	0.3822	0.3371	0.367	0.3363
Islam	0.4324	0.5812	0.4448	0.583
Secular/Agnostic	0.0492	0.03	0.0489	0.0298
Other	0.021	0.0214	0.0215	0.0215
Don't know/refuse	0.0176	0.0099	0.0159	0.0092
Missing	0.0976	0.0203	0.1018	0.0201
Female	0.4749	0.5015	0.4686	0.4967
Educational attainment				
Completed elementary edu or less	0.2963	0.4586	0.2935	0.4549
Completed secondary to 3-yr tertiary	0.4952	0.4443	0.4943	0.448
Completed 4 yrs tertiary +	0.201	0.0932	0.2062	0.0937
Don't know/refuse	0.0075	0.0039	0.006	0.0034
Marital Status				
Single/never married	0.3107	0.3336	0.3158	0.3364
Married/domestic partner	0.5872	0.5817	0.5877	0.5811
Separated/divorced	0.0481	0.0359	0.0468	0.0355
Widowed	0.0500	0.0464	0.0461	0.0449
Don't know/refuse	0.0040	0.0025	0.0037	0.0021
Age	38.9 0.07	36.6 0.09	38.5 0.07	36.5 0.09
Age missing	0.0028	0.0015	0.0024	0.0013
Sample Size	94,289	50,698	87,986	48,195

Most refugees: Chad, Germany, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Uganda
Data: World Bank data on refugees, population; Gallup survey data on attitudes, demographics
Authors' calculations using appropriate Gallup weighting procedures

In Figure 4 we show the countries in our sample ranked according to the proportion of survey respondents who respond their area is a good place for immigrants. Overlaying the bar chart is a plotted line indicating the number of refugees per 100,000. There appears to be no relationship between refugees and attitudes toward immigration as we measure in our study. However, regression analysis will allow us to control for differences in characteristics in these countries and will suggest that there is a relationship between the two. We omit Jordan and Lebanon from this chart due to their much-higher levels of refugees per 100,000. If we include them in the chart, the axis is distorted for the other countries in the sample, obscuring the variation we otherwise observe.

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Figure 4



Source: Authors' calculations using UNHCR data and Gallup World Poll data.
This chart uses the narrow definition of GoodPlace.
Due to their extraordinarily high number of refugees per 100k, we omit Jordan and Lebanon from this chart. Jordan averages 30,187 refugees per 100,000, and 0.50 of respondents report their area is a good place for immigrants. The correlating numbers for Lebanon are 20,787 and 0.55.

6. Results

We use ordinary least squares to estimate the linear probability model implied by Equation 1. We present our results in Tables 4 through 6. When we compare the results for the broad and narrow definitions of *GoodPlace* for the full sample and the sample with the most refugees, we find minimal difference in coefficients.[5] Importantly, the coefficient on the number of refugees is unchanged across the two specifications.

We present our results for the full sample for the broad and narrow *GoodPlace* measures in Table 4. The coefficient of interest, refugees per 100,000, is statistically significant and negative, indicating that more refugees per 100,000 in a country correlates with a lower likelihood that a survey respondent in the country reports their area is a good place for immigrants. That said, the coefficient is tiny. The coefficient suggests that 1,000 new refugees per 100,000 in the country correlates with a 0.92 percentage point decrease in the proportion of respondents who report their area is a good place for immigrants. Given the base of around 55% of respondents saying their area is a good place, this is a very small effect. While we interpret the coefficient size, we suggest that the focus should be on the sign given the subjectivity of the measure.

[5] As mentioned previously, in some places we present results for the narrow measure, and the corresponding results for the broad measure are available upon request.

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Turning to the demographic characteristics included in the regression, we see that Muslim respondents are 6.5 percentage points less likely than Christian respondents to report their area is a good place for immigrants, and those of other religions (non-Christian, non-Muslim, but reporting a religion) are 2.9 percentage points less likely than Christian respondents to do so.

Our results for education also follow conventional expectations. We find that the higher the level of educational attainment, the more likely an individual is to report their area is a good place for immigrants. The effect for those completing secondary through three-year tertiary education is 1.2 percentage points higher than those with less than secondary. For those completing four years of tertiary education or more, the effect exceeds 6 percentage points, relative to those with less than a secondary education.

We find weak results for marital status. The strongest effect is for those who are separated or divorced, relative to single, never married individuals. Those who are separated or divorced are about 2 percentage points less likely to report their area is a good place for immigrants. We find no statistically important results for the age variables.

Table 4: Full Sample OLS Results: Is this country a good place for immigrants (Yes = 1/No = 0)

	Broad		Narrow	
	Coefficient	**t-stat**	**Coefficient**	**t-stat**
Asylum refugees per 100k	-0.0000092 0.0000015	-6.22	-0.0000092 0.0000015	-6.12
Religious affiliation (left-out: Christian)				
Islam	-0.0574 0.0077	-7.51	-0.0647 0.0077	-8.38
Secular/Non-religious	-0.0125 0.0084	-1.48	-0.0113 0.0085	-1.33
Other	-0.0242 0.0124	-1.94	-0.0289 0.0126	-2.29
Don't know/Refused	-0.0629 0.0134	-4.7	-0.0384 0.0142	-2.7
Missing	-0.0247 0.0091	2.71	-0.0248 0.0090	-2.75
Female	-0.0012 0.0037	- 0.32	0.0060 0.0038	1.56
Education (left-out: Less than secondary)				
Secondary - 3-yr Tertiary	0.0166 0.0054	3.04	0.0124 0.0057	2.18
Completed 4 yrs tert+	0.0654 0.0064	10.1	0.0614 0.0066	9.32
Don't know/Refused	-0.0225 0.0238	-0.95	0.0389 0.0274	1.42
Marital status (left-out: single/never married)				
Married/ Dom. Partner	0.0085 0.0052	1.64	0.0093 0.0053	1.76
Separated/ Divorced	-0.0220 0.0093	-2.37	-0.0206 0.0096	-2.16
Widowed	0.0130 0.0102	1.28	0.0254 0.0106	2.39
Don't know/Refused	-0.0570 0.0307	-1.86	-0.0336 0.0322	-1.04
Age	0.0004 0.0006	0.71	-0.0005 0.0006	-0.71
Age squared	0.0000 0.0000	-2.12	0.0000 0.0000	01

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Missing Age	-0.0425 0.0371	-1.15	-0.0204 0.0398	-0.51
Constant	0.8793 0.0168	52.31	0.8218 0.0168	48.97
N	94,289		87,896	
R-squared	0.1394		0.1238	
Includes Year Effects?	Y			
Includes Country Effects?	Y			

Data: World Bank data on refugees, population; Gallup survey data on attitudes, demographics
Authors' calculations using appropriate Gallup weighting procedures

In Table 5, we show results for the subsample of countries which welcome the most refugees (and, in this sample, the most refugees per 100,000). The coefficient on the variable of interest, asylum refugees per 100,000, is statistically significant and negative. We find that an additional 1,000 refugees per 100,000 in the country correlates with a 1.4 percentage point decline in the proportion of survey respondents who report their area is a good place for immigrants. Note that this coefficient is larger in size than that for the full sample. We address this further in the discussion.

We find similar results for Muslim respondents relative to Christian respondents, in that followers of Islam are about 5 percentage points less likely to report their area is a good place for immigrants. However, the results for "other" religions are not statistically distinguishable from zero with this subsample.

The results for educational attainment also mirror that found in the previous table. Higher levels of education correlate with the individual being more likely to report their area is a good place for immigrants. The effect is 1.4 percentage points for those with a completed secondary education relative to those who did not complete it, and about 4.4 percentage points for those who complete a tertiary education relative to those who did not complete a secondary education.

The coefficient on separated/divorced is not statistically significant. Age is not an important predictor of whether an individual will report their area is a good place for immigrants in this subsample.

Table 5: Most Refugees Sample OLS Results: Good place for immigrants (Yes = 1/No = 0)

	Broad		Narrow	
	Coefficient	**t-stat**	**Coefficient**	**t-stat**
Asylum refugees per 100k	-0.0000138 0.0000016	-8.6	-0.0000139 0.0000016	-8.53
Religious affiliation (left-out: Christian)				
Islam	-0.0495 0.0088	-5.64	-0.0576 0.0089	-6.48
Secular/Non-religious	-0.0303 0.0141	-2.14	-0.0297 0.0135	-2.19
Other	-0.0128 0.0185	-0.69	-0.0194 0.0188	-1.03
Don't know/Refused	-0.0682 0.0250	-2.72	-0.0377 0.0254	-1.48
Missing	0.0580 0.0233	2.49	0.0428 0.0238	1.8
Female	0.0076 0.0054	1.42	0.0178 0.0055	3.27
Education (left-out: Less than secondary)				
Secondary - 3-yr Tertiary	0.0191	2.9	0.0144	2.15

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	0.0066		0.0067	
Completed 4 yrs tert+	0.0464 0.0092	5.04	0.0435 0.0093	4.69
Don't know/Refused	-0.0823 0.0465	-1.77	-0.0385 0.0520	-0.74
Marital status (left-out: single/never married)				
Married/ Dom. Partner	-0.0073 0.0076	-0.95	-0.0049 0.0078	-0.63
Separated/ Divorced	-0.0300 0.0148	-2.02	-0.0240 0.0149	-1.61
Widowed	0.0117 0.0152	0.77	0.0245 0.0154	1.59
Don't know/Refused	-0.1907 0.0529	-3.61	-0.1537 0.0596	-2.58
Age	0.0007 0.0009	0.77	-0.0005 0.0009	-0.59
Age squared	0.0000 0.0000	-1.36	0.0000 0.0000	0.31
Missing Age	-0.1172 0.0753	-1.56	-0.0949 0.0780	-1.22
Constant	0.4787 0.0192	24.94	0.5187 0.0195	26.61
N	50,698		48,195	
R-squared	0.042		0.0485	
Includes Year Effects?	Y			
Includes Country Effects?	Y			

Data: World Bank data on refugees, population; Gallup survey data on attitudes, demographics
Authors' calculations using appropriate Gallup weighting procedures

We follow these regressions with a series of estimations on limited subsamples, reported in Table 6. We use the division presented in Figures 1 through 3, and show the results. Starting with the variable of interest, asylum refugees per 100,000, an interesting pattern emerges as we move from low to high refugee countries. We see that low-refugee countries have the largest coefficient (in absolute value). In low-refugee countries, the presence of 100 new refugees per 100,000 correlates with a 70 percentage point decrease in the proportion who report their area is a good place for immigrants. Compared to the full sample or most-refugees sample, this effect is enormous. Note that as we move across the table, the more refugees a country has per 100,000, the weaker the effect becomes. It remains negative and statistically significant throughout.

Table 6: OLS Results: Is this country a good place for immigrants (Yes = 1/No = 0, Narrow)

	Low Refugee		Medium Refugee		High Refugee	
	Coefficient	**t-stat**	**Coefficient**	**t-stat**	**Coefficient**	**t-stat**
Asylum refugees per 100k	-0.0069849 0.0005459	-12.8	-0.0000306 0.0000046	-6.7	-0.0000139 0.0000025	-5.48
Religious affiliation (left-out: Christian)						
Islam	-0.0784 0.0236	-3.32	-0.0688 0.0101	-6.83	-0.0439 0.0150	-2.93
Secular/Non-religious	0.0122 0.0151	0.81	-0.0334 0.0097	-3.44	0.1434 0.1020	1.41
Other	-0.0336 0.0220	-1.53	-0.0514 0.0185	-2.77	0.0304 0.0258	1.18
Don't know/Refused	-0.0496 0.0208	-2.39	-0.0325 0.0192	-1.7	0.0445 0.0733	0.61

Missing	-0.0460 0.0224	-2.05	0.0145 0.0158	0.92	0.0153 0.0101	1.5
Female	-0.0071 0.0059	-1.21	0.0180 0.0057	3.15	-0.0248 0.0129	-1.92
Education (left-out: Less than secondary)						
Secondary - 3-yr Tertiary	0.0090 0.0118	0.76	0.0353 0.0075	4.72	0.0166 0.0161	1.04
Completed 4 yrs tert+	0.0750 0.0124	6.04	0.0586 0.0096	6.09	-0.5783 0.0258	-22.4
Don't know/Refused	0.1133 0.0375	3.03	-0.0021 0.0405	-0.05	0.0134 0.0149	0.9
Marital status (left-out: single/never married)						
Married/ Dom. Partner	0.0326 0.0081	4.05	-0.0114 0.0079	-1.45	-0.0674 0.0358	-1.89
Separated/ Divorced	-0.0178 0.0144	-1.24	-0.0175 0.0136	-1.29	0.0419 0.0299	1.4
Widowed	0.0421 0.0163	2.58	0.0015 0.0157	0.1	0.0563 0.2169	0.26
Don't know/Refused	-0.0071 0.0432	-0.16	-0.0987 0.0483	-2.04	-0.0046 0.0018	-2.55
Age	-0.0008 0.0010	-0.73	0.0008 0.0009	0.84	-0.0000 0.0000	2.51
Age squared	0.0000 0.0000	-0.02	0.0000 0.0000	-1.05	-0.6060 0.0376	-16.1
Missing Age	0.0160 0.0602	0.27	-0.0002 0.0564	0		
Constant	1.4661 0.0522	28.06	0.5107 0.0210	24.31	0.9085 0.0537	16.93
N	34,056		40,394		13,536	
R-squared	0.1886		0.1015		0.015	
Year and Country Effects Included						

Data: World Bank data on refugees, population; Gallup survey data on attitudes, demographics
Authors' calculations using appropriate Gallup weighting procedures

One result that changes across the three samples is the coefficient on the highest education group, those who completed 4 or more years of tertiary education. While this coefficient is between 0.059 and 0.075 for the medium and low refugee groups, respectively, it is -0.578 for the high refugee group. Keeping in mind that the high refugee group includes only two countries, Jordan and Lebanon, it is still interesting to note that in these high-refugee countries, more highly educated individuals are less likely to report their area is a good place for immigrants.

7. Discussion and Implications

There are two notable aspects of our findings. First, we find a consistently negative correlation between the number of refugees per 100,000 in a country and the probability a survey respondent answers that their area is a good place for immigrants. This suggests that as more refugees live in a country, the general attitude about whether respondents' area is a good place for immigrants falls. Second, and perhaps more important, our results are statistically significant, but lack economic importance. The coefficients are so small in most specifications that we hesitate to make strong statements based on our results. Is it meaningful for policy makers to find a consistently negative, yet tiny correlation?

That said, the consistent negative sign hints at an important tie between the two measures (refugees per 100,000 and attitude toward the area's quality for immigrants), and one

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that ought to be further studied. It seems that as more refugees live in an area, the more the general population holds a negative opinion about their area being a good place for immigrants and, therefore, refugees. One potential implication is that people are viewing the question of immigration as primarily a resource-allocation problem. That is, if too many immigrants are here, then there is not enough <resource> to go around.

While our results on the religious identity of survey respondents were stable across specifications, we caution against the interpretation that Muslim individuals are anti-immigration. Our study uses the blunt measure of "is your area a good place for immigrants" as the outcome, which is not a measure of the welcoming posture of survey respondents. As much as it may measure an individual's thoughts toward immigration, it also captures respondents' view of government and perceptions of neighbors' attitudes toward immigrants.

This leads us to the primary weakness of the study. While we aim to examine the relationship between refugee flows and attitudes toward immigration, our survey instruments are not precise. We are unable to examine whether the respondent has a positive or negative view toward immigrants, a welcoming or hostile or indifferent posture. We are only able to measure their response to the question "is your area a good place." Individuals may answer no because they wish to limit their exposure to outsiders. They may answer no because they distrust the government's handling of immigration or because they feel like the government's rhetoric towards immigrants is hostile. They may answer no due to fears of economic or labor market effects, or cultural change brought by immigrants. Their answer may be incongruent with their feelings, as they could observe that immigrants would thrive in their area, yet resist the settlement of immigrants or vice versa, in that they wished that more immigrants would feel welcome, but they recognize that their area of the country is not hospitable.

One other weakness of the study is whether our focus on refugee flows and an attitude toward immigration overlap. We posit that most individuals are not well-informed on the difference between refugees and immigrants, but view both as outsiders moving in. There may be a vague understanding that refugees are in more dire situations, but we expect that most individuals would not be able to provide a cogent response to a question on the difference between the two. This lack of distinction in the public view supports our approach in this study.

8. Conclusion

The results of this study provide motivation for future work. Future work will consider a more finely-tuned measure of refugees within the country. It could be that refugee populations which are ethnically, culturally, and socioeconomically similar to the resident population of the country inspire different reactions in residents than those who are different. That is, Ukrainians fleeing to Poland may be treated differently than Afghanis fleeing to the United States. Evaluating the characteristics of the refugees relative to the characteristics of the resident population could help shed light on this potential variation.

The world continues to provide new refugee crises. As countries welcome refugees, or deny them entrance and protection, do the residents of the countries alter their attitude toward immigrants? Our study suggests that more refugees correlate with slightly lower views by individuals that their area is a good one for immigrants. In future studies, we aim to explore the cultural and religious differences between refugees and native residents in

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order to determine whether the negative relationship is driven by the "otherness" of the refugee, versus a more resource-based opposition to an immigration surge.

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